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Although cognitivism has lost some ground recently in the philosophical 
circles, it is still the favorite view of many scholars of the emotions.
1
 
According to cognitivism, emotions are not simply feelings or perceptions of 
physiological sensations. On the contrary, emotions, like other mental states, 
such as beliefs, mental pictures, desires, intentions etc., have a common 
characteristic: they are directed toward something or someone; they have, in 
other words, intentional objects.
2
 The intentional object of the emotion enables 
us to identify the emotion as the kind of emotion it is and distinguish it from 
other emotions and mental states. For instance, if I characterize the object of 
my emotion as dangerous, then I will be able to identify the emotion as fear, or, 
if I think that the object of my emotion is unjust, I will be able to identify it as 
anger, and so on.  
According to most cognitivists, emotions are essentially propositional 
attitudes such as evaluative beliefs, thoughts or judgments, although it is 
granted that they are often accompanied by feelings, physiological 
disturbances, etc.
3
 Consequently, making cognition as a necessary, and, 
sometimes sufficient condition of the emotion, cognitivists are able to account 
for the intentionality of the emotion.  Cognitive states such as beliefs and 
judgments are essentially intentional. What is more, through the evaluative 
cognitions cognitivists are able to identify the emotion as the kind of emotion it 
is, as well as distinguish it from other emotions and mental states. For instance, 
what distinguishes envy from jealousy is that in the case of envy I believe or 
think that you have something that I want to have, whereas in the case of 
jealousy I believe that something or someone that should rightfully be favored 
and enjoyed by me is being favored and enjoyed by someone else.   
Even though I agree with cognitivism's insight that emotions typically 
involve some type of evaluative intentional state, I shall argue that in some 
cases, less epistemically committed, non-propositional evaluative states such as 
                                                 
1
Among those who ascribe to some form of cognitivism are: Kenny (1963), Alston (1967), 
Taylor (1985), Lyons (1980), DeSousa (1987), Gordon (1987), Solomon (1993) and Nussbaum 
(2001). 
2
The intentionality of mental states was first captured by Franz Brentano, and then it was 
brought to the Analytic Tradition by Anthony Kenny.  See Brentano (1973) and Kenny (1963). 
3
Cognitivists disagree about the role of feelings in the emotion. While some believe that they 
are inessential (Solomon, 1993; Nussbaum, 2001), others believe that they are necessary or 
constitutive components of emotion (Lyons, 1980; Taylor, 1985; Alston, 1967; Kenny, 1963).  
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mental pictures can do a better job in identifying the emotion, or, in providing 
its intentional object. In order to show this, I shall examine a case of irrational 
fear and a case of humiliation where the requisite identificatory beliefs are 
missing.
1
   
 
 
A Case of Irrational Fear 
 
According to most cognitivists, to experience fear is to hold the evaluative 
belief, thought or judgment that the object of fear is dangerous. Such belief is 
supposed to provide the intentionality of fear, identify it as the kind of emotion 
it is, and thereby differentiate it from all other emotions and mental states. 
However, although this may be true in some cases of fear, often times one 
might be afraid without believing, thinking or judging that one is in danger. 
This is usually the case with irrational fears, where one's beliefs are at odds 
with one's emotion. For instance, we can imagine a situation where a perfectly 
rational person is afraid of a harmless spider, even though she knows that it is 
not dangerous.  If this is the case, then one is at loss on what emotion one is 
feeling. For, according to most cognitivists, bodily “feelings” are inessential to 
emotions, and even if they do exist, they are not able to identify the emotion.
2
 
That is, a cognitivist cannot resort to the special, qualitative nature of feelings 
for the identification of emotion. Thus, given that in this particular case the 
identificatory belief of fear ‘the spider is dangerous’ is missing, cognitivism is 
unable to account for the intentionality of fear, and, as a result, it fails to 
identify the emotion.  
A cognitivist might argue that even though the arachnophobic lacks the 
belief that this particular spider is dangerous, she might have other beliefs in 
the “region” of dangerousness of the spider. For instance, she might think that 
this spider resembles other truly dangerous spiders, that the present spider 
looks like a black widow, and black widows are dangerous spiders, etc.  I do 
not deny that it is, of course, possible that the arachnophobic has such beliefs.  
However, these beliefs do not necessarily amount to the requisite belief that 
this particular spider is dangersous.  
But if there is no evaluative belief that would identify the irrational fear of 
the spider, then perhaps evaluative beliefs (or other propositional attitudes) are 
not as omnipresent in emotions as most cognitivists think.  Consequently, 
cognitivism is unable to account for the intentionality of irrational emotions, 
                                                 
1
Although my argument will eventually show that all cognitivist accounts that claim that 
emotions require evaluative propositions are deficient, for the sake of clarity and simplicity, I 
will suppose in my examples that the intentional propositional states necessary for the emotion 
are beliefs and judgments. 
2
Robert Solomon, in his seminal work The Passions (1993) has likened the role of feelings and 
their supposed omnipresence in emotions as the fleas ‘plaguing’ a dog.  They are always there, 
but they do not form the essence of the dog!  (See Solomon, p. 73.) Given that the scope of this 
essay is not an overall critique of all the different forms of cognitivism, I will not discuss this 
here.  For a comprehensive critique of cognitivism please see Deigh (1994), Griffiths (1997) 
and Goldie (2000.) 
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and as a result, it cannot identify nor distinguish such emotions. How we are to 
understand the intentionality of irrational emotions will emerge towards the 
end of this essay.  Now let us turn to a case of humiliation that would also 
show that cognitivism is insufficient in explaining some emotions. 
 
A Case of Humiliation 
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that there is an essential belief or 
propositional thought involved in humiliation, namely, the belief that my 
situation is degrading or my status has been degraded (either in my own eyes or 
in the eyes of others). It can still be shown that there are cases of humiliation in 
which such belief is absent. Consider such a case as it is presented in James 
Joyce’s short story 'The Dead'.1 The protagonist, Gabriel, after spending his 
evening at a party given by his aunts, is now with Gretta, his wife, who is 
telling him about a certain boy in the gasworks who died for her sake. Gabriel, 
in an effort to stop her, is making ironic comments, but Gretta does not even 
notice his irony:  
 
Gabriel felt humiliated by the failure of his irony and by the evocation 
of this figure from the dead, a boy in the gasworks. While he had been 
full of memories of their secret life together, full of tenderness and joy 
and desire, she had been comparing him in her mind with another. A 
shameful consciousness of his own person assailed him. He saw 
himself as a ludicrous figure, acting as a penny-boy for his aunts, a 
nervous, well-meaning sentimentalist, orating to vulgarians and 
idealizing on his own clownish lusts, the pitiable fatuous fellow he 
had caught a glimpse of in the mirror (p. 216).
2
  
 
What is the identificatory belief in Gabriel's humiliation? One may be 
tempted to say that the identificatory belief is that his status has been degraded.  
But Joyce nowhere tells us that Gabriel holds such belief or thought. 
Alternatively, one might think that the requisite belief is that he is a ludicrous 
figure, or that he is acting as a penny-boy for his aunts, etc.  But, these beliefs, 
if indeed Gabriel does hold them, are not entailed by Gabriel's humiliation. 
One could feel humiliated without having such beliefs.  
Yet, an objector could plausibly claim that in so many words, the 
aforementioned beliefs, (i.e. that he is a ludicrous figure, that he is acting as a 
penny boy for his aunts, etc.) if they were Gabriel's beliefs, could add up to the 
belief that Gabriel is degraded, and thereby they could constitute his 
humiliation. That may be true. I do not deny that there could be cases of 
humiliation where a person’s beliefs that he is a ludicrous figure, idealizing on 
his own clownish lusts, etc., could add up to the belief that one is degraded.  
But this is not how Joyce depicts Gabriel. What Joyce writes is: 'He saw 
himself as a ludicrous figure, …a nervous, well-meaning sentimentalist, orating 
                                                 
1
Although the same story is used in G. Taylor's Pride, Shame and Guilt, my discussion here is 
concentrated on an entirely different aspect of the story. 
2
Joyce, J., Dubliners, New York: The Viking Press, 1961. 
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to the vulgarians...the pitiable fatuous fellow he had caught a glimpse of in the 
mirror' [my italics]. It is important to notice that Joyce does not tell us that 
Gabriel believes that he is a fatuous fellow, acting as a penny boy for his aunts, 
etc.  If so, then it is possible for Gabriel to believe that he is a wonderful person 
that everyone likes and admires, but picture, or see himself as a ludicrous 
figure and fatuous fellow who acts as a penny boy for his aunts, etc. That is, it 
is perfectly compatible with Joyce's description that, all things considered, 
Gabriel's stable belief is that he is a kind person helping his aunts, valiantly 
trying to enlighten the people he is lecturing to, and that, so far from being 
ludicrous, he is, in his own way, improving the lot of the people around him.  
But if this is the case, then although Gabriel does feel humiliated, he does not 
believe that he is degraded (either in his own eyes, or the eyes of others.) 
Accordingly, feeling humiliated does not require the belief that one is 
degraded. If the Queen of Great Britain and Commonwealth slips and falls 
down, she could well feel humiliated without at all believing that she is 
degraded.   
But if Gabriel, as described by Joyce, does not believe that he is degraded, 
how is he able to identify his emotion as humiliation? The clue lies in Joyce's 
use of 'he saw himself as a ludicrous figure, acting as a penny boy for his 
aunts', etc.  To follow up this clue, I will borrow some ideas from Francis W. 
Dauer's essay 'Between Belief and Fantasy: A Study of the Imagination' and 
suggest that what brings about Gabriel's humiliation is his picturing or seeing 
himself in a certain way.
1
 Such 'picturing' or 'seeing' is closer to imagination 
than to belief. 
 
 
Imagination vs. Belief: Dauer’s View 
 
According to Dauer, there are instances of imagination, which use pictures 
instead of concepts as their medium.  For example, there is a use of seeing or 
picturing as where the proposition 'I see or picture X as being Y' can be true, 
while the viewer knows X is not Y (Dauer, p. 266). This seems to be the case 
with a lot of attitudes towards ourselves and others. We do say things such as 
'she still sees him as the young man she met at the prom, while she knows that 
he is her middle-aged husband', or 'he still sees himself as the best player, when 
he knows otherwise'.  Does this mean that the wife and the player have two 
contradictory beliefs? Of course not. Generally, we do not accuse people who 
say such things of cognitive deficiency. The reason seems to be that we take 
such cases to be closer to imagination than to belief and cognition. At the same 
time, these are not cases of free imagination, because we use the same sense of 
'seeing as' or 'picturing as' when we say things such as 'though I know 
otherwise, I cannot picture him as being a cook', or, 'though I know she has 
broken a lot of hearts, I cannot see her as a heart breaker'. That is, there must be 
                                                 
1
Dauer, F., 'Between Belief and Fantasy: A Study of the Imagination' in Pursuit of Reason: 
Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavell, ed. Cohen, Guyer, and Putnam, Lubbock: Texas Tech 
Press, 1993. 
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something that enables or prevents a person to see or picture someone or 
something to be in a certain way. Dauer calls cases of seeing or picturing as 
‘imagination that lies between belief and fantasy’:  
 
Because criteria and constraints are present we may call this form of 
imagination, imagination that lies between belief and fantasy. It is like 
free imagination because it can coexist with belief and knowledge to 
the contrary, yet it is like belief, because there are external constraints 
and the criteria for imagining approximate the criteria for believing 
(Dauer, p. 268).   
 
This type of imagination has two important features: 
  
a) External constraints. There must be something external to the 
picture or imagining that makes the picturing possible, i.e. it might 
be the belief that the husband still has a youthful liveliness, which 
generates the picturing. Or, alternatively, I must believe that there 
is something in her that prevents me from seeing or picturing her 
as a heartbreaker. Perhaps I believe that she is not attractive or that 
she lacks self-esteem. However, the constraints can be somewhat 
nebulous.  In fact, this is one of the reasons why the phenomenon 
of seeing as, or picturing as cannot be seen as a matter of belief. 
The constraints that generate the picturing do not have to be 
objectively true. Although a loving wife might interpret her 
husband's lively behavior as youthful, someone else might see it as 
a behavior of a silly old man.  Similarly, although the hefty stature 
of the heartbreaker prevents me from seeing her as a heartbreaker, 
someone else might see it as the very reason for being a 
heartbreaker. 
b) Criteria that approximate those of believing X to be Y. If the 
criterion for believing X to be Y is exhibiting the relevant 
behavior and the feelings stemming from such belief, then a 
similar criterion could be placed for seeing or picturing X as Y.  
For instance, if someone says that he believes that the Chair is the 
best Chair the department ever had, we expect him to behave 
accordingly, i.e. to get upset when people are making jokes at the 
expense of the Chair, or to agree with some of Chair's policies, etc.  
If, however, his behavior and feelings show otherwise, (i.e. he 
never votes for the Chair's policies, or when others talk about the 
Chair's 'virtues' he gets angry with them, etc.), unless an 
explanation is given, we will be reluctant to accept his avowals 
that he really believes that the Chair is the best Chair the 
department ever had.  This is also the case with picturing or seeing 
as. If someone pictures himself to be the best player, while he 
knows that he is not, he is expected not to get annoyed or angry 
when he doesn’t get the Best Player of the Year Award, or when 
An Anthology of Philosophical Studies: Volume 6 
 
88 
 
others do not include his name among the best players. However, 
such person is still expected to show some signs that he sees 
himself as the best player. For instance, he might feel pride and 
joy when little boys come and tell him that they believe he is the 
best player, or he might give advice to young players with the air 
of a person who is the best player, etc. 
 
The medium for this state of imagination is mental pictures instead of 
propositions. Pictures have different logical features from propositions. Three 
of the distinct logical features of pictures are the following: 
 
a. They are representational. 
b. There are objects and people depicted in the picture. 
c.  Some pictures can portray actual objects and people, and the 
portrayed objects and people may or may not portray the actual 
persons aptly (Dauer, p. 271).  
 
 
According to this reading, to see or picture X as being Y is to see the 
picture that depicts Y as an apt portrait of X.   Pictures are the right medium for 
this kind of imagination, because while a proposition is simply true or false of 
a person (a concept either subsumes or doesn't subsume a person) a picture can 
portray a person with varying degrees of aptness. 'Being a young man' is 
simply false of the middle-aged husband, but a ‘picture of a young man’ can 
still portray the husband aptly; perhaps it is because of the husband’s lively 
behavior. The judgment by which we judge Y to be an apt portrait of X, is 
essentially an aesthetic judgment; accordingly, if one sees Y as an apt portrait 
of X and another does not, this does not mean that one is right and the other 
wrong. Hence, mental pictures cannot be reduced to propositions and beliefs 
because they lack the truth or falsity dimension that is ontologically connected 
to propositions and beliefs. Further, whether a picture is an apt portrait of 
someone or something is a purely aesthetic matter. One either sees or does not 
see a certain portrait as apt. There are no objective criteria by which one can 
judge or persuade another that a certain picture is an apt portrait of someone or 
something. Aptness is something one sees for oneself. One cannot take 
someone else's word for it, as one might in order to believe a proposition. And 
even if there is a good and bad taste in aesthetic judgments, one cannot be said 
to have made a mistake if one takes a picture to portray something or someone 
aptly. Yet, one can be said to be mistaken if one forms a false belief about 
something or someone. 
 
 
Humiliation and Imagination 
 
Now let us return to Gabriel's case and see how this type of imagination 
explains his humiliation. It is true that Gabriel has various beliefs regarding 
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that evening. However, we need not ascribe to him the beliefs that he is a 
ludicrous, pitiable, fatuous fellow, idealizing on his own clownish lusts, etc.  
He certainly has, for instance, the beliefs that he is helping his aunts for the 
party he thought uninteresting, that he was talking to an uncultured audience, 
that his wife, a woman that he very much loves, was not listening to him when 
he was talking to her about their secret life together, etc. These beliefs function 
as external constrains in order for Gabriel to see or picture himself as a 
ludicrous figure, fatuous fellow, orating to the vulgarians, etc. Taking such a 
pictures to be apt portraits of himself brings about Gabriel's humiliation. 
To illustrate the point, let us modify a bit Gabriel's case. Suppose that 
Gabriel knows that the propositions 'I am a ludicrous, fatuous fellow’, etc. are 
false. Yet, he takes them to apply to him at that moment. But if the propositions 
are false, how could they apply to him?  Obviously, they must apply to him in 
some way other than truth. The only alternative, it seems, is that Gabriel sees 
the picture of a ludicrous figure, fatuous fellow, etc., as an apt portrait of 
himself at that particular instant. And, given that aptness lacks the truth or 
falsity dimension, it is perfectly understandable that while Gabriel thinks that 
the propositions “I am a ludicrous, fatuous fellow” are false, as he does not 
think that they truly apply to him, he sees the mental picture of a ludicrous, 
fatuous fellow as an apt portrait of him. 
Now, the question is how picturing oneself as a ludicrous figure, or fatuous 
fellow, etc. amounts to humiliation. Well, it seems that by picturing himself as 
a fatuous fellow and the like, Gabriel also pictures himself as having been 
degraded, because he finds the portrayed person in the picture to have been 
degraded. This, in turn, brings about Gabriel's humiliation. Therefore, although 
Gabriel does not have the relevant identificatory belief that his situation is 
degrading, by picturing himself in a 'degrading light' he is able to identify his 
emotion as humiliation.  
But one might ask, why can we not say that Gabriel just exhibits a case of 
free imagination, and so, he is imagining the proposition 'I am a ludicrous, 
pitiable fellow' to be true? For, if he does imagine such proposition as being 
true, then we can explain his humiliation by saying that he also imagines that 
being a fatuous, ludicrous figure, is degrading, and consequently, feels 
humiliation. This might be feasible in some cases.
1
 However, this is not what 
happens in Gabriel's case. According to Joyce, Gabriel is not daydreaming, nor 
is he fantasizing. The events of that evening led him to picture himself as a 
ludicrous fellow, etc. Had those events not happened, he would not have 
pictured himself in that way. That is, there are external conditions and 
constraints that led Gabriel to picture himself as a ludicrous and fatuous fellow.  
Yet, again, one might object, if I allow beliefs to play the role of external 
constraints, do I not also agree with the cognitivist who believes that cognitive 
propositional states such as beliefs are necessary for the emotion? To say that 
                                                 
1
Greenspan (1988) and Stocker (1987) have also suggested that emotions can arise simply by 
imagining certain propositions to be true.  Although I agree with their insights, I also think that 
the main medium of imagination is mental pictures, and not propositions or concepts, for, while 
concepts and propositions could be true or false, pictures could merely be apt or inapt.  
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beliefs are necessary for emotions is a triviality. Surely emotions require 
beliefs. However, what is problematic with this type of cognitivism is not the 
claim that beliefs or judgments are necessary for emotions, but that in each 
emotion there is a particular evaluative belief (or proposition), which is 
essential to the emotion and identifies it as the kind of emotion it is. Also, we 
have to remember that although Gabriel's beliefs function as conditions and 
external constraints for his humiliation, these conditions are not decisive; for, 
one can meet the conditions, have all those beliefs, and still not picture oneself 
in such a way, and, therefore, not feel humiliated.  That is, the beliefs that lead 
Gabriel to his picturing, and consequently to his humiliation, are just vehicles 
for his emotion, and as such, they do not play any essential role in his 
humiliation. 
 
 
Irrational Fear and Imagination 
 
We are now equipped to explain the case of the irrational fear of the 
spider.  As we recall, our arachnophobic lacks the evaluative belief 'this spider 
is dangerous' that would identify and explain her fear. I would like to suggest 
that in such case, although the person believes that the spider is harmless, she 
pictures or sees it as something genuinely dangerous, a black widow perhaps, 
and seeing this picture as an apt portrait of the present harmless spider, brings 
about her fear. Furthermore, the arachnophobic's beliefs that are in the 'region' 
of dangerousness, i.e. 'spiders are ugly and disgusting creatures', 'to be bitten 
by them is unpleasant', 'this spider resembles a “black widow”' and '”black 
widows” are dangerous spiders', function as external constraints and conditions 
for picturing or seeing the present spider as a dangerous “black widow.”  If the 
arachnophobic had none of these (or relevant) beliefs, she would not have seen 
the picture of the dangerous spider as an apt portrait of the present spider.
1
  
Thus, even if there is no belief to identify the irrational fear of the spider and 
account for the intentionality of the emotion, there is a mental picture that is 
able to do a better job in both areas. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our discussion has shown that evaluative propositional states are not 
necessary for the identification and the intentionality of emotions. Sometimes 
imagination with its medium of mental pictures is better equipped to explain 
and identify a person's emotion.
2
  If this is the case, then the cognitivist view is 
                                                 
1
Again, we have to remember that while some beliefs must act as external constraints, the 
particular beliefs, which act as the external constraints, are not required.  
2
If my account regarding mental pictures is correct, then it also shows the inadequacy of the so-
called weak cognitivist view according to which emotions may not require such strong 
epistemological states as beliefs, but they certainly require some type of propositional thought, 
and hence concepts.  Although I am sympathetic to such accounts because they recognize the 
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mistaken in claiming that emotions entail propositional attitudes, and, 
consequently, an analysis of emotions solely in terms of concepts and 
cognitions is unsatisfactory. 
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inadequacies of straightforward cognitivist theories, I disagree with their insistence on the use 
of propositions and concepts in emotions. As we have seen, sometimes concepts are not 
necessary for an emotional experience.   
 
